2026-06-15 ワシントン州立大学
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＜関連情報＞
- https://news.wsu.edu/press-release/2026/06/15/higher-tax-burden-less-corruption-wsu-researchers-examine-civic-engagement/
- https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S088261102600012X
個人の税負担と政治腐敗：SALT控除上限からの証拠 Individual tax burdens and political corruption: Evidence from the SALT deduction cap
Jeffrey Gramlich, Yoonsoo Nam, Chase Potter, Aruhn Venkat
Advances in accounting Available online: 17 April 2026
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.adiac.2026.100877
Abstract
We investigate whether individual tax burdens affect political corruption. Higher individual tax burdens could increase government corruption by lowering after-tax income and incentivizing corruption. Alternatively, higher individual tax burdens may decrease corruption by increasing citizen political engagement and monitoring of politicians. We use the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act’s (TCJA’s) $10,000 cap on state and local tax (SALT) deductions and cross-county differences in property tax levels as plausibly exogenous variation in individual tax burdens. We find that future local political corruption convictions are associated with a 4.3% decrease for every 1% increase in tax burdens. Further, we document that increased individual tax burdens raise voter turnout. Four separate cross-sectional analyses find greater corruption reduction when the logic expects it. Together, our results provide evidence that tax burdens increase civic engagement and citizen monitoring of public officials, which in turn could contribute to lower corruption.
